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Abstract 
As the number of disasters and crises affecting the tourism industry increases, it is 
becoming necessary to understand the nature of these disasters and how to manage and 
limit the impacts of such incidents. This paper defines crises and disasters before 
discussing the area of crisis communication management and crisis communication in the 
tourism industry. The paper then applies the foot and mouth disease (FMD) which 
occurred in the United Kingdom to crisis communication theory at a national level (by 
examining the response of the British Tourist Authority) and at a local level (by 
examining the response of a District Council). The response was limited in part because 
of a lack of preparedness, but also due to the nature of the foot and mouth outbreak, and 
the speed and severity of international media coverage. Action was taken in the 
emergency phase of the crisis and was reactive involving inconsistency in developing key 
messages to stakeholders, partly due to confusion and a lack of information at the 
national level. Recovery marketing was also limited due to the length of time of the 
disease outbreak. This paper provides lessons for destinations and organisations are 
discussed which may help develop crisis communication strategies for tourism 
organisations. 
 2 
 
Keywords: Tourism, Disaster, Crisis, Communication, United Kingdom, Foot and 
Mouth 
 
Dr Brent W. Ritchie (PhD). Senior Lecturer, School of Service Management, University 
of Brighton, 49 Darley Road, Eastbourne, BN20 7UR, United Kingdom, Tel: +44 1273 
643 634, Fax: +44 1273 643 619, Email: b.ritchie@bton.ac.uk. and Tourism Program, 
University of Canberra, ACT 2601, Australia.  
 
Humphrey Dorrell and Daniela Miller. Former Honour Students. School of Service 
Management, University of Brighton, 49 Darley Road, Eastbourne, BN20 7UR, United 
Kingdom. 
 
Dr Graham A. Miller (PhD). Senior Lecturer, Centre for Tourism 
University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom, Tel: 020 7911 5000 ext 3054, Fax: 
020 7911 5171, Email: G.Miller01@wmin.ac.uk 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
In February 2001, the first case of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) was confirmed in the 
UK since an outbreak of the disease in 1967.  A total of 2030 cases of the disease were 
identified and a total of over 4 million animals were culled during the crisis with 
worldwide media broadcasts showing burning carcasses of culled animals. The English 
Tourism Council (ETC) predicted that losses to English tourism in 2001 would be £5bn, 
while in 2002 and 2003 reductions would total £2.5bn and £1bn respectively (ETC, 
2001a).  On January 15th 2002 government officials announced that the disease had 
finally been defeated after 11 months of battling the outbreak. Despite the end of the 
disease, the outbreak has deeply affected the farming and tourism industry and raised 
questions concerning government policy toward the farming and tourism industry. 
Questions have been specifically raised concerning the responsiveness and preparedness 
of the tourism industry for the FMD and the ability of tourist promotion agencies to 
reduce the negative media coverage due to slow response time. Although the outbreak 
was not expected, Faulkner (2001) notes there are an increasing number of disasters and 
crises which affect the tourism industry, ranging from natural to human influenced 
disasters.  This has been made most evident since the events of September 11th 2001, 
which dramatically impacted upon the tourism industry illustrating the need to 
understand and effectively manage such incidents, with crisis communication an 
important part of this management.   
 
Faulkner (2001) argues that there is a lack of research on disaster phenomena in the 
tourism industry, on the impacts of such events on both the industry and specific 
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organisations, and the responses of the tourism industry to disasters.  Yet Lee and Harrald 
(1999:184) note that crisis management, disaster recovery, and organisational continuity 
are important competencies for managers in both the public and private sector.  This 
paper aims to address these deficiencies as well as to consider FMD in the light of crisis 
communication, as it appears that communication is an important aspect of effectively 
and efficiently dealing with crisis situations. An examination of the management of the 
FMD and the crisis communication strategies employed may assist other destinations and 
organisations in developing crisis management and crisis communication strategies to 
deal with unforeseen events. First a discussion of crisis management definitions and crisis 
communication theory takes place prior to discussion of crisis communication 
specifically for the tourism industry. Then the paper outlines the research methods and 
research findings related to crisis communication and the FMD outbreak in the UK. 
 
Crisis and Disaster Definitions 
A number of authors have attempted to define a crisis to help improve their 
understanding of this phenomenon. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992:15) believe that a crisis is 
a “disruption that physically affects a system as a whole and threatens its basic 
assumptions, its subjective sense of self, its existential core.” Selbst (1978 in Faulkner 
2001:136) defines a crisis as “any action or failure to act that interferes with an 
organisation’s ongoing functions, the acceptable attainment of its objectives, its viability 
or survival, or that has a detrimental personal effect as perceived by the majority of its 
employees, clients or constituents.” Selbst focus on perceptions implies that if an 
organisation’s publics or stakeholders perceive a crisis, a real crisis could evolve from 
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this misconception, illustrating that perception management is a key activity in managing 
crises.  
 
Faulkner (2001) considers the principal distinction between what can be termed a ‘crisis’ 
and a ‘disaster’ to be the extent to which the situation is attributable to the organisation 
itself, or can be described as originating outside the organisation.  Thus, a ‘crisis’ 
describes a situation “where the root cause of an event is, to some extent, self-inflicted 
through such problems as inept management structures and practices or a failure to adapt 
to change”, while a “disaster can be defined as “where an enterprise…is confronted with 
sudden unpredictable catastrophic changes over which it has little control” (Faulkner, 
2001:136).  
 
Crisis Management and Control 
Lee and Harrald (1999:184) state that “natural disasters can disrupt the supply and 
distribution chains for even the best prepared businesses…service businesses are 
increasingly vulnerable to electrical, communication and other critical infrastructure 
failures.”  Kash and Darling (1998:179) agree, and claim that it is no longer a case ‘if’ a 
business will face a crisis; it is rather a question of ‘when’, ‘what type’ and ‘how 
prepared’ the organisation is to deal with it.  Both statements illustrate that although 
organisations are able to design pre-crisis strategies to help with crisis management they 
are often unable to prevent a crisis from occurring. However, the real challenge is to 
recognise crises in a timely fashion and implement coping strategies to limit their damage 
(Darling et al., 1996). Authors such as Burnett (1998) and Kash and Darling (1998) note 
that decisions undertaken before a crisis occurs will enable more effective management 
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of the crisis, rather than organisations being managed by the crisis and making hasty and 
ineffective decisions. Proactive planning through the use of strategic planning and issues 
management will help reduce risk, time wastage, poor resource management and reduce 
the impacts of those that do arise (Heath, 1998).   
 
Coombs (1999) notes, all crises are different and crisis managers need to tailor responses 
to individual crises rather than try to plan for every individual situation. Heath (1998:272) 
agrees and states that “no crisis has exactly the same form, the same time limitations, the 
same demand for resources…or the same temporal, social and economic threats.”  In 
addition crises are indefinite, numerous, unexpected and unpredictable (Parsons, 1996; 
Williams et al. 1998). Authors such as Kash and Darling (1998) believe that although 
crisis management is a requirement for organisations, and although business leaders 
recognise this, many do not undertake productive steps to address crisis situations.  
 
Other crisis management research has focussed on the stages of crises to assist in 
understanding crisis phenomenon and assist in proactive and strategic management of 
crises (see Richardson, 1994; 1995).  Fink (1986) and Roberts (1994) both developed 
slightly different models to explain the lifecycle of crises (see table 1). Faulkner (2001) 
developed the first tourism specific disaster management framework and subsequently 
applied this framework to the Katherine Floods in Australia (see Faulkner & Vikulov, 
2001).   
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Although understanding the nature of crises are important, understanding how to manage 
crises are more critical. In particular, managing communication and perceptions through 
a crisis communication strategy can limit the negative media coverage and manage 
perceptions both during a crisis or disaster and at the recovery/resolution stage. Crisis 
communication and marketing is important to provide information to key publics and to 
help tourism destinations limit the impact of a crisis as well as help them recover from 
incidents by safeguarding the destination image and reputation which is of immense 
value to tourism destinations. The development of crisis communication and marketing 
strategies by organisations is therefore a critical competency for tourism managers. 
 
 
Crisis Communication and Crisis Marketing 
Crisis management literature emphasises the need to have a detailed communication 
strategy as the media can encourage the flow and the intensity of a crisis or even turn an 
incident into a crisis (Keown-McMullan, 1997). Barton (1994) believes that a strategic 
crisis plan can help limit the damage from a crisis and allow an organisation to 
concentrate on dealing with the crisis at hand. Marra (1998:461) notes that poor 
communication strategies can often make the crisis worse as a deluge of questions is 
often asked from a wide range of stakeholders including reporters, employees, 
stockholders, government officials and public residents. The initial response is important 
and table 2 illustrates five main considerations for responding to crises. 
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Responding quickly to demands of the media and publics is important as the media have 
deadlines to work to and are looking for quick sources of information.  If the crisis team 
does not fill the void, someone else will (Coombs, 1999). Zerman (1995:25) agrees 
stating that “the mass media has the power to make a break a business.” Sensationalist 
media coverage of the 1980 Mt St Helens disaster and the 1985 East Kootenay forest 
fires were noted as contributing to confusion during the emergency phase as the media 
were blamed for misleading public opinion concerning the severity of the disasters. This 
also impacted upon the long term recovery phase for the destination (see Murphey and 
Bayley, 1989). However, difficulties have been noted in managing the media as it is 
unlikely that there will be a time delay between the start of any crisis and media coverage 
(Ashcroft, 1997). 
 
Crisis communication is mainly concerned with providing correct and consistent 
information to the public and enhancing the image of the organisation or industry sector 
faced with a crisis. An emphasis on communication and public relations is required to 
limit harm to an organisation in an emergency that could ultimately create irreparable 
damage. Co-operation with the media is considered vital because the media provides 
information to the public (Berry, 1999), illustrating the need to keep the media briefed 
frequently so misinformation is reduced. Regular two-way communication is the best 
way of developing a favourable relationship with publics (Coombs, 1999:134). 
Consistency of response is also noted as a key element in crisis communication. The 
ability to provide a consistent message to all stakeholders will build credibility and 
preserve the image of an organisation instead of tarnishing reputations through providing 
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inconsistent messages (Coombs, 1999). Barton (1994) believes that many issues are 
overlooked by crisis managers regarding crisis communication, namely to focus on 
identifying the audience, developing goals for communicating effectively and creating 
strong positive messages.  
 
Marketing and advertising is also noted as an important part of crisis communication, 
especially during the long term recovery stage of a crisis or disaster. As Heath (1998:26) 
notes “crisis management is as much about dealing with human perceptions about the 
crisis as it is about physically resolving the crisis situation.”  This suggests that crisis 
communication is an essential part of managing crises and disasters and will be an 
important consideration for the tourism industry. 
 
Crisis Communication in the Tourism Industry 
Despite the susceptibility of the tourism industry to external and internal crises and 
disasters, and the importance of destination image and marketing, little research has been 
undertaken concerning crisis communication for the tourism industry. As Beeton 
(2001:422) notes: 
 
crises occur at all levels of tourism operations with varying degrees of severity, 
from much publicised environmental economic and political disasters through to 
internally generated crisis such as accidents and sudden illness. 
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Crises can impact negatively upon destination image, especially if it is dramatised or 
distorted through rumours. Henderson (1999:108) states that “National Tourist 
Organisations with their responsibility for general destination marketing, research and 
development have an important role to play in the process of travel and tourism crisis 
management, representing and acting on behalf of the industry as a whole.” This quote 
emphasises the importance of a national tourist organisation in responding to crises, 
implementing crisis communication strategies and designing recovery marketing 
campaigns. However, Henderson (1999) found that in the case of the Asian Economic 
Crisis, the Singapore Tourist Board implemented reactive strategies which took time to 
implement reducing their effectiveness.  
 
Soñmez et al (1999) noted the importance for marketers to have a prepared crisis 
communication and marketing plan, as the cost of this will be far less than the costs 
associated with a downturn in visitor confidence and visitation due to a slow response. 
Soñmez et al. (1999) suggest several ways to improve crisis communication for tourism 
crisis management including the preparation of a task force involving the private and 
public sector including a PR team, recovery marketing team, information coordination 
team and a finance and fund raising team.  
 
The development of Fiji’s Tourism Action Group (TAG) during the military coups 
illustrates the advantages of forming such as group. Fiji’s tourist industry responded 
faster than expected because of the implementation of a task force combined with target 
marketing to restore confidence. As Soñmez et al. (1999:8) note “it is imperative for 
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destinations to augment their crisis management plans with marketing efforts, to recover 
lost tourism by rebuilding a positive image.”  
 
Research Methods 
Research was carried out to examine the effectiveness of the crisis communication of the 
British Tourist Authority at the national level and an unnamed District Council at the 
local level in England. This research was carried out by two separate yet linked research 
projects that explored similar themes concerning crisis communication specifically 
associated with the FMD in the United Kingdom.  
 
Secondary and Primary Research Strategy 
Throughout both pieces of research, the researchers undertook thorough secondary data 
analysis of press releases, newspaper articles, position statements and relevant marketing 
documents and policies related to the FMD and the organisations under study. Primary 
research was carried out in both pieces of research through the use of in-depth semi-
structured interviews to supplement the secondary data collected. All interviews were 
undertaken in January and February 2002 and the following outlines the procedures 
undertaken for each project. 
 
In the study at the national level, tourism representatives were selected judgementally 
from the British Tourist Authority (BTA) and key industry sector groups that represent 
the national interests of tourism and hospitality businesses. These representatives were 
interviewed for between 45 minutes and an hour and a half, and a tape recorder was used 
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to record the interviews for later transcription. All were interviewed concerning the 
response of the British Tourist Authority to the crisis and their effectiveness in 
implementing crisis communication strategies. Although the BTA was the focus of the 
study, in order to avoid bias other tourism organisations were selected on the basis of 
their ability to judge the effectiveness of BTA’s crisis marketing and communication 
strategy. Representatives from the various industry organisations were elite interviews at 
the managerial or CEO level and were well informed and had a high level of expertise 
and knowledge. Something which Saunders et al. (2000) note is important in undertaking 
a judgmental sample selection. Confidentiality was provided to all respondents and 
therefore no respondents are identified in this paper. From the literature several themes 
were investigated within the interviews and corresponded with Coombs (1999) themes 
for responding to crises through communication. The researcher classified the data into 
emerging themes based upon Coombs (1999) classification and transcribed, read and re-
read the transcriptions before placing comments into themes which are discussed in the 
results below.  
 
In the study at the District Council level tourism representatives were selected 
judgementally from the District Council and also included 5 representatives from the 
accommodation industry, local tourism attraction and visitor group, the National Trust, 
and an individual operator. They were interviewed for between 45 minutes and an hour 
and a half while Faulkner’s (2001) disaster response grid and disaster framework were 
used as a guide to the semi-structured interviews. The representative of the District 
Council was interviewed first and then industry representatives were interviewed. Similar 
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to the national level study the researcher tape-recorded and transcribed the interviews and 
placed them into themes based on Faulkner’s (2001) tourism disaster framework model 
and relating them to crisis communication theory and literature where applicable.  
 
Potential Limitations and Bias 
Although relevant industry and government representatives were interviewed concerning 
crisis communication strategies implemented by the BTA and the District Council, these 
representatives do not represent the views of industry who do not belong to these 
organisations or who do not share their view. The BTA and the District Council avoided 
answering some questions directly in relation to its activities. Although other 
organisations were able to examine the role of the BTA and District Council, as Alreck 
and Settle (1997) note, affinity bias may exist as some of these representatives have a 
close working relationship with the organisations under study. Some respondents may 
have been concerned that their comments would make their way back to these 
organisations, despite assurances of confidentiality.     
 
Interviewer bias is possible but was reduced through the use in both instances of semi-
structured techniques and a set of themes developed from the literature which were used 
to structure the interview. Researchers did not make any personal opinions during the 
interviews and used a similar tone of voice and dress throughout, which have been noted 
to minimise interviewer bias (Saunders et al., 2000).  
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Results and Discussion 
Due to space constraints not all results can be presented in this paper. The following 
section first outlines the development of a crisis response strategy, before discussing 
respondents response time, the consistency of crisis communication strategies, access to 
information, and finally, the implementation of recovery marketing strategies. Where 
applicable the results are compared and contrasted with literature and theory discussed 
earlier in the paper. 
 
Crisis Response Strategy 
At the national level tourism industry representatives believed that the BTA failed to 
react sufficiently and effectively, as they did not appear to have a crisis management 
strategy in place prior to the outbreak. Nevertheless, the BTA stressed that they did have 
a “fairly basic crisis management strategy in place” although the British Hospitality 
Association believed that it was too little too late (Cotton, 2001). Having an established 
and formal crisis communication strategy may have reduced the response time and 
developed quicker communication channels to facilitate the distribution of information 
and the reduction in inconsistent messages (discussed later). The BTA excused the 
insufficiency by explaining that the intensity of the FMD could not be forecast. 
Nevertheless, they acknowledged that the FMD has taught them “how to have an even 
better crisis response strategy (in the future).”  
 
Similar findings were discovered at the local level with the District Council noting that 
“there was something on file from the previous foot and mouth outbreak but not 
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much…there was only a rumour that there was one (a disaster plan) lying around.” 
Although they did have one regarding foot and mouth it was last examined briefly after 
the 1967 outbreak. Furthermore, from industry representatives interviewed none had a 
crisis plan in place for their own business before the outbreak. Perhaps more surprisingly 
the tourism industry seemed to have learnt little from their experience at the local level. 
According to one representative “I don’t know whether people would have (a plan) in the 
future because I think that people felt that it has happened once and couldn’t happen 
again.” Only two people expressed an interest in developing a crisis management plan in 
the future, because crises are seen as infrequent and that little can be done to alter their 
impacts. The only contingency considered was setting aside money and resources to deal 
with unforeseen events. However, crisis management theory suggests that established 
plans can limit the severity of crises and disasters through proactive contingency planning 
(Kash and Darling, 1998; Heath, 1998).  
 
Response Time in the Emergency Phase 
Because of a combination of a delay in identifying foot and mouth, a disbelief of the 
severity of such a crisis and a lack of proactive planning, there was a delay in reacting to 
the crisis by the tourism industry at both a national and local level. Both the BTA and 
industry at the national and local level only accepted the implications of the outbreak at 
the emergency phase and reacted only due to negative publicity. The BTA in their media 
releases noted this in a statement issued by the head of EU Affairs in Brussels which 
stated “in dealing with the Belgian media, the current tactics are more reactive than 
proactive” (BTA 2001a). Although in the personal interview the BTA insisted that they 
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reacted within the first three days of the outbreak it was not until 28 March (one month 
later) that a BTA board meeting took place to co-ordinate communications and prepare a 
recovery plan for England. Industry representatives at the national level agreed that the 
response of the tourism sector generally had been slow and the power and effect of the 
media had been under-evaluated. However, the response of the BTA was to attempt to 
market and improve the image of the UK to target markets but this process was hampered 
by the ongoing outbreak and continued spread of the disease throughout the UK. 
 
At the local level, the majority of respondents did not believe the implications of the 
outbreak until the emergency phase. According to one respondent “we knew what was 
going on, but we were trying not to think about it.” Furthermore, another respondent 
described decision making as “mainly stabbing in the dark.”  This slow response could be 
because the initial outbreaks were in other districts and there seemed to be confusion 
about the potential impacts and what should be done about them. Little communication 
was occurring between decision makers at the national level and the local level. A lack of 
knowledge of the disease and its implications meant that footpaths and attractions were 
closed and the District Council sought advise over what to do as they did not want to put 
tourism businesses at risk. This decision making was further complicated by mixed 
messages at the national level by government over whether the countryside was closed or 
actually open for business, illustrating that consistency in responding to the crisis and 
communicating positive messages to key audience groups was lacking. 
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Inconsistency of Responses 
This inconsistency of messages sent out by tourism organisations and other government 
agencies involved in handling the disease impacted upon the dissemination of facts and 
figures concerning the disease, but more importantly confused potential tourists’ and the 
tourism industry. Coombs (1999) suggests that consistency is important to avoid 
speculation and confusion. In the case of the FMD both were evident at the national and 
local level. The international market confused the outbreak with the BSE disease and 
some had the perception that it was deadly to humans. The domestic public was unsure 
whether they should try and help rural economies by visiting such areas or whether they 
could best help by staying home and not spreading the disease. This statement is 
supported by market research conducted by the English Tourism Council (2001b) that 
showed consumers were still confused in June 2001, several months after the outbreak. 
Contradicting statements were being published and this was even more confusing by the 
fact that many areas were totally unaffected by the disease. The BTA representative 
interviewed noted that there was no united approach and that different messages and 
statements were provided by different tourism and hospitality organisations. 
 
Another potential problem which resulted in inconsistency in messages was the 
encroaching deadline for the government to announce a general election.  The 
government held a strong lead over political rivals in the polls and had made little secret 
of its desire to face a spring election.  However, the images of burning cows saturating 
news coverage meant an early election was impossible unless the disease could be 
eradicated without risking the rural vote that was heavily influenced by the farmers.  Yet, 
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the crisis/disaster conflict reflects the multi-sectoral nature of industry in rural areas, and 
there was disagreement over how the emergency stage should be handled and whether 
vaccination would be a better strategy than burning animals. This debate was held during 
the emergency phase of the outbreak which suggests that decisions may not have been 
made with thorough consideration for their impacts. It was the policy of slaughter and 
burn that ensured a negative media coverage and images, severely damaging the tourism 
industry. 
 
Inconsistency also occurred at the local level according to respondents. The District 
Council felt that in hindsight a more consistent approach was required. The Council 
stated “we were all calling for consistency at the same time, but the situation was moving 
so fast that no one seemed to be able to do it. I received 145 e-mails during this period, a 
lot of these were policy documents, technical specifications and general advice that 
would change day by day and area by area.” This lack of consistency was not the fault of 
the District Council but their inability to answer queries created an information void and 
created what one respondent termed a “knee jerk response.” The combination of 
resources between the District Council (local level) and the County Council (regional 
level) also caused inconsistency and contradictory advice. As the District Council 
respondent noted, “the County Council had put notices and signposts at the local level 
which stated that most footpaths in the County are closed, which was not effective when 
at the local level we were trying to encourage people to come to the area.” It was not until 
after April 2001 and the immediate phase of the crisis that co-ordination between the two 
bodies led to more consistency, but by then rumour and confusion had a damaging effect. 
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One of the major reasons for this lack of consistency according to local level respondents 
was a lack of access to relevant information.  
 
Access to Information 
The BTA felt that the media was very intense for the first three months and at times their 
reporting was hostile, sometimes neutral but rarely friendly leading to misinformation 
(BTA 2001b). The BTA set up an Immediate Action Group (IAG) consisting of internal 
BTA staff from a range of departments to help implement strategies regarding the 
outbreak. The BTA also implemented a number of other measures to provide better 
access to information and provide consistent and positive messages which are outlined in 
table 3. 
 
Initially access to information was difficult due to uncertainty and slow response of the 
national government. Although the development of communication channels was created 
by the BTA as information and policy was developed, many industry operators were 
simply unable to access some of the information due to a lack of e-mail and Internet 
facilities. For instance, in the South East of England only 60% of Tourist Information 
Centres had e-mail facilities and prior to the outbreak only six out of ten Regional Tourist 
Boards had web sites (DCMS 2001). The web site however, was useful for providing 
information to potential overseas visitors. 
 
At the local level access to information was difficult and the District Council were unsure 
what to do and what the risks were to local farmland. As one respondent noted the 
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“attractions were seeking advice as they did not know how they were going to be 
affected” and were passed to different national organisations in search of information 
which was described by an industry respondent as “frustrating.” Sources of information 
followed a long chain of command from national government, regional tourist boards, 
county councils to the local level. At the local level consistent messages were created by 
press and media contacts as well as briefing Tourist Information Centre staff regarding 
what attractions and footpaths were open. However, research indicated that staff had 
detailed information concerning attractions, but little knowledge of footpaths which 
attract a number of hikers to the local region and are a major tourist asset. 
 
Recovery Marketing Strategies 
As noted earlier, tourism organisations, especially NTOs are in a position to assist with 
the marketing and recovery of destination image or reputation that may have been 
damaged through a crisis or disaster. Recovery marketing at the national level was 
complicated by the fact that not all regional areas were affected by the outbreak and thus 
wondered what all of the fuss was about. As mentioned above some areas actually 
improved their situation as holiday markers changed their travel patterns from rural or 
countryside areas to coastal resorts (Wright, 2002). Certain attractions also benefited as 
visitors changed from outdoor activities to indoor activities such as museums and 
galleries.  
 
There were no tourism resources damaged by FMD to be repaired and the blackened 
image of the UK could not be repaired until the disease had been defeated, despite many 
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areas of the UK having never been affected by the disease.  Thus, the nature of the 
disaster meant that there was no “turning point” when a town was re-opened, or a 
building restored or re-built, instead areas of the country gradually tried to persuade 
visitors that it was safe to visit, while other areas of the UK continued to suffer with new 
outbreaks of the disease.  Such a scenario led to calls from some sectors of the tourism 
industry to proceed with advertising campaigns encouraging visitors to the countryside, 
while for others, such confidence-building campaigns were misplaced until the problem 
had universally been removed.   
 
The English Tourism Council (ETC) was given £3.8m to promote tourism to a domestic 
audience in April 2001, which was spent on specific market campaigns, coupled with 
developing web sites to inform potential visitors of where was safe to visit.  The ETC 
calculated that this financial aid generated 766,000 additional visits and produced a return 
on investment of £27 for each £1 spent (ETC, 2001c).  In May, a further £12m was given 
to the BTA for international marketing, while no further finance was available for the 
ETC and the domestic market (ETC, 2001c). The BTA started planning in September 
2001 to re-brand and re-image Britain through a new £5 million campaign called UK OK 
which was implemented in January 2002 to attract the visiting friends and relatives 
market. This was targeted at seven selected key markets (USA, Canada, Germany, 
France, Belgium, Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland). However, industry 
representatives believed that it was not enough for such a large target audience. Further 
funding for marketing of Britain overseas was secured in April 2002 with £20m 
contribution from the government, £5m cash from industry and a further £15m of 
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collateral marketing by the campaign partners (BTA, 2002).  This money will be spend 
on the ‘Only in Britain: Only in 2002’ campaign which is expected to attract an extra one 
million visitors in 2002 and generate £0.5b for the national economy (BTA, 2002). 
 
At the local level recovery was undertaken from the intermediate phase of the crisis 
onwards as the area did not have any confirmed cases of the foot and mouth disease. A 
publicity campaign was implemented to attract tourists back to the local area but 
representatives felt that it was difficult to get the interest of the media who were more 
interested in “mountains of cows in Cumbria (being burned).” The recovery strategy was 
also limited by budget constraints and a reluctance to put large amounts of money 
towards a recovery strategy when the disease was not yet defeated at the national level. 
According to the District Council this “would have been a waste of money.” The ETC 
helped later in the long term recovery stage by providing money for publicity campaigns 
and publicity work was conducted in conjunction with county councils. Recovery was 
quick at the local level under study, partly due to good weather and also because major 
competitors such as Cumbria and the South West of England were still battling the 
outbreak throughout the recovery phrase. 
 
Conclusion  
This paper has outlined the importance of crisis management, and in particular crisis 
communication for tourism organisations. Tourism is highly susceptible to external crises 
and disasters, yet even after the foot and mouth outbreak few lessons appear to have been 
learnt by some parts of the industry. At the national level a greater number of changes 
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have been implemented and the BTA are constantly refining their crisis management 
strategies and plans. The BTA did the best they could under the circumstances, yet the 
nature of the FMD meant that recovery marketing was considered wasteful until after the 
outbreak had been defeated and a lack of a crisis management and communication 
strategy prior to the outbreak hampered recovery.  
 
The absence of a crisis communication or management strategy at the local level was 
evident and yet it appears doubtful if one will be created at all due to the perceived 
uniqueness of individual disasters and crises. Yet as Kash and Darling (1998) and Beeton 
(2001) note all organisations and tourism organisations suffer from external or internal 
crises of varying magnitudes. In particular, this paper has noted that a lack of crisis 
management strategy combined with a slow response time, inconsistent communication 
strategies and poor access to information limited the effectiveness of crisis 
communication for the tourism industry. In particular, access to information was critical 
for consumers, industry and local regions. Recovery marketing has been implemented, 
and in the case of the local level recovery was rapid as they appear to have benefited at 
the expense of other regions. Yet, at the national level recovery marketing is still 
continuing and the success of which is yet to be evaluated. The FMD outbreak was 
chaotic as noted by Fink (1986). The fragmentation of the tourism industry did little to 
alleviate this confusion with decisions being made in the heat of the crisis, illustrating the 
need planning before such incidents occur. 
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Greater research and understanding is required in the field of crisis communication and 
theory to help improve the understanding of such incidents. This understanding will 
hopefully aid the development of suitable crisis communication models for managers to 
implement which can be varied depending on the scale and type of crisis or disaster 
encountered. Faulkner’s (2001) model is a useful start, however more research is needed 
into disaster phenomena and crisis communication in the tourism industry. The cost of 
developing a crisis management strategy would be far less than the cost of not having one 
and a key aspect to any crisis strategy is crisis communication. It is hoped that this paper 
has contributed in some way to the field of crisis communication in tourism through 
evaluating the FMD outbreak in the UK. 
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Table 1: The crisis and disaster lifecycle 
 
Faulkner’s (2001) stages Fink’s (1986) stages Robert’s (1994) stages 
1. Pre-event  Pre-event: where action can be 
taken to prevent disasters (e.g. 
growth management planning or 
plans aimed at mitigating the 
effects of potential disasters) 
2. Prodromal Prodromal stage: when it 
becomes apparent that the crisis is 
inevitable 
 
3. Emergency Acute stage: the point of no return 
when the crisis has hit and 
damage limitation is the main 
objective 
Emergency phase: when the 
effects of the disaster has been 
felt and action has to be taken to 
rescue people and property 
4. Intermediate  Intermediate phase: when the 
short-term needs of the people 
must be dealt with –restoring 
utilities and essential services. 
The objective at this point being 
to restore the community to 
normality as quickly as possible 
5. Long term (recovery) Chronic stage: clean-up, post-
mortem, self-analysis and healing 
Long-term phase: continuation of 
the previous phase, but items that 
could not be addressed quickly 
are attended to at this point 
(repair of damaged infrastructure, 
correcting environmental 
problems, counselling victims, 
reinvestment strategies, 
debriefings to provide input to 
revisions of disaster strategies) 
6. Resolution Resolution: routine restored or 
new improved state 
 
Source: Reprinted from Tourism Management, 22 (2), Faulkner, B., Towards a framework for tourism 
disaster management, page 140, Copyright (2001) with permission from Elsevier Science. 
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Table 2: Five Point Crisis Communication Plan  
 
Point Action 
1. Respond quickly. Develop two way communication with the media to provide 
accurate information to key stakeholders. This will reduce misinformation and help 
develop a consistent message. 
2. Give instructing information such as what happened, when it happened, where it took 
place, and how it occurred. Also discussion of the precautions stakeholders should 
take and what corrective action is being undertaken. 
3. Consistency in developing the communication plan and key messages including 
discouraging any unofficial spokespersons. 
4. Openness and accessibility including availability of spokespersons and generating a  
willingness to disclose information and being honest. 
5. Express sympathy to victims. 
Source: Adapted after Berry (1999) and Coombs (1999:114)  
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Table 3: British Tourist Authority Aim and Major Strategies to  
Limit Severity of the Foot and Mouth Outbreak 
 
Aim 
 
 
Strategies 
 To correct misleading information in their overseas markets concentrating on 
the ones that had been most severely hit by the crisis.  
 
 They employed a global PR agency to manage the negative perceptions of 
Britain overseas.  
 A new web site provided information on whether attractions and events were 
open and showed that by Easter 80% of attractions were actually open.  
 The development of media bulletins and newsletters were also used to 
facilitate the exchange of information. 
 
Aim 
 
 
Strategies 
 To assure summer holiday bookings and provide correct and consistent 
messages 
 
 Including market research and tactical advertising to assure summer holiday 
bookings. 
 An e-mail campaign to 10 million people world wide. 
 A number of trade and press trips. 
 
Aim 
 
 
Strategies 
 To re-brand and re-market Britain as a tourist destination to aid in the 
recovery of the tourism destination. 
 
 UK OK and ‘Only in Britain: Only in 2002’ campaign 
 
 
